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The US Army and Future Security Force Assistance Operations
In the decades to come, the most lethal threat to the United States' safety and security--a city poisoned or reduced to rubble by a terrorist attack--are likely to emanate from states that cannot adequately govern themselves or secure their own territory. Dealing with such fractured or failing states, is in many ways, the main security challenge of our time. 1 -Robert M. Gates, US Secretary of Defense-2010 If there are organizations operating in ungoverned regions of the world that legitimately represent "the most lethal threats to the nation's (US) security and safety" 2 the question is, how can the US influence the ability of a sovereign foreign nation to reduce those threats? Past attempts by the US over the last two decades include the employment of several military strategies to deny safe haven 3 to al-Qaeda and its affiliates, each producing varying levels of success. This included short duration unilateral retribution bombing campaigns, US Special Forces-led air and ground campaigns, and full-scale ground invasions and occupation, followed by far-reaching Counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns. None of these approaches fully satisfied the intent of preventing al-Qaeda and its affiliates from taking advantage of all failed and failing states and vulnerable spaces from which to plan and operate worldwide.
When the US military showed progress in one region, the al-Qaeda network often followed the path of least resistance and established operations in another location where local governments were unable or unwilling to interdict them. As of 2011, alQaeda claimed affiliation with 14 other terrorist groups and an operational capability in over 30 nations. 4 The response to al-Qaeda's ability to rapidly relocate into safe haven is a US strategy that appears reactive as opposed to pre-emptive, chasing the threat 2 from one location to the next. Reversing or even slowing that trend would be a major accomplishment for the US military.
This current strategy against al-Qaeda, based heavily on the use of Counterterrorism (CT) techniques and authorities, has been effective at maintaining pressure on the organization's Core leadership. However it is a strategy that equates tactical success--the elimination of al-Qaeda leaders--with long-term sustainable security. The CT strategy needs to be balanced with an attempt to develop foreign nation security forces through an increase of Security Force Assistance (SFA)
operations. This vision aims to develop the security structure in partner nations to a level of capability to the point where they are able to deter al-Qaeda from establishing operations within their territorial borders over the long term. In current joint US military doctrine, SFA is described as:
…central to the success of U.S. strategies in the contemporary and future operating environments. Our nation's capacity to conduct SFA supports future strategies through fully integrated capabilities to organize, train, equip, rebuild, and advise foreign security forces and their supporting institutions. Foreign Security Forces (FSF) include not only military forces, but also police, border forces, and other paramilitary organizations at all levels. 5 SFA extends well beyond military-to-military training and conceptually addresses security as a system of interoperable components to include: civilian command and control, rule of law, internal policing functions, force development, and the capability to sustain operations across the full spectrum of operations. SFA provides a broader approach to addressing the multiple efforts required to defeat the threat presented by alQaeda and its affiliates and to reduce the emergence of safe havens.
Research Question and Thesis 3
The primary aim of this paper is to expand upon the question, "Is Security Force
Assistance the ideal operational method to prevent the use of safe haven by al-Qaeda and its affiliated organizations in failed and failing states and other ungoverned regions of the world?" Secondary aims are to define the conditions that generally exist prior to al-Qaeda moving into a failed or failing state or other ungoverned regions, as well as to look at the potential future role of US Army Conventional Force 6 Brigade Combat Teams in supporting SFA operations.
The basic proposition offered is that to effectively deny safe haven over the long term, the US must come to rely less upon tactically focused lethal targeting as part of a CT strategy and more upon building sustainable and effective partner nation security sector capacity. To achieve this, the US must increase the employment of US Army
Conventional Forces in SFA missions, to assist in the development of security sector capacity among select partner nations. 7 This is a long-term and potentially costly method, but it is still in the best interest of the US to develop the entire security sector capacity of partner nations, to facilitate their ability to support civilian authority, protect their population, control their territory and reduce the availability of safe haven to alQaeda within their borders. By answering the primary research question, this study hopes to further the discussion regarding the increased employment of US Army
Conventional Forces in SFA operations to deny safe haven to al-Qaeda and its
affiliates.
This paper is organized into three sections. It begins by framing the general operational environment through a description of the current threat posed by al-Qaeda and its affiliates and the general characteristics of safe haven and failed or failing states 4 and ungoverned areas. This is followed by a discussion of the recent refinements to strategic guidance, doctrine and authorizations, as well as a discussion on the benefits, challenges and the operational effectiveness of recent SFA operations. The paper then reviews the current US Army Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) concept and recommends refinements in training and organization for Army Brigades assigned to conduct SFA missions.
Threats
It is generally agreed that the US is willing to intervene abroad when its interests are threatened by terrorist organizations. The continued existence of al-Qaeda and the number of failed and failing states that offer potential safe haven to the organization remains an item of particular interest to the US. Therefore, any discussion about where to execute SFA missions has to be framed within the context of threats, location and US interests. In spite of some recent claims that al-Qaeda no longer represents a significant global menace, the evidence suggests that the organization will still attempt to gain a foothold and establish operations in locations where desirable conditions exist.
These "Preconditions for al-Qaeda Infiltration" include: poverty, social inequalities, ineffective government institutions, and inept security forces. When combined, these pre-conditions will help create segments of a nation's population that become vulnerable to the rhetoric and influence of radicalized social leaders. By understanding the threat and recognizing the existence of the Preconditions for alQaeda Infiltration, the US can focus SFA efforts early to assist partner nations in denying access to safe haven.
Proclamations about the demise of al-Qaeda should be viewed with skepticism in light of the strategic patience and resiliency the group exhibits. In 2010 the Combating Terrorism Center issued a report that highlighted al-Qaeda's dwindling capability, and its overall ineffectiveness. The report also infers that the organization is strategically Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), all mentioned above, is different in 2013 than as described in the December 2010 report. These three groups are considered to possibly be the most capable contemporary al-Qaeda affiliates, and they represent the durability of the al-Qaeda enterprise.
The US government still maintains that the most dangerous external threat to the security of the nation remains al-Qaeda and its affiliates. The 2012 US National Security Strategy (NSS) provides the basis of the overarching framework being employed against that threat:
6
The United States is waging a global campaign against al-Qaeda and its terrorist affiliates. To disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qaeda and its affiliates, we are pursuing a strategy that…denies al-Qaeda safe haven…and builds positive partnerships…around the world. Success requires a broad, sustained, and integrated campaign that judiciously applies every tool of American power-both military and civilian-as well as the concerted efforts of like-minded states and multilateral institutions. 9 This NSS guidance builds upon the June, 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism, which recognizes that, "the preeminent security threat to the United States continues to be from al-Qaeda and its affiliates and adherents." 10 The CT strategy identifies elimination of safe haven and building partner nation's CT capacity as major objectives in defeating the threat stating that, "Al-Qaeda and its affiliates and adherents rely on the physical sanctuary of ungoverned or poorly governed territories. In close coordination with foreign partners, the United States will continue to contest and diminish al-Qaeda's operating space through mutually reinforcing efforts. 11 These two strategic guidance documents provide the general direction and intent from which operators develop and implement US strategy.
However, the threat of al-Qaeda requires further scrutiny. When deciding where to employ US resources to defeat a threat, it is important to determine the operational reach of al-Qaeda and its affiliates and to categorize them by intent, and most importantly, by their capability. When that analysis is combined with the previously mentioned Preconditions for al-Qaeda Infiltration, a clear picture of where to employ US forces in SFA mission roles becomes evident.
al-Qaeda Core
The threat presented by al-Qaeda comes in two distinct forms: al-Qaeda "Core" elements and al-Qaeda affiliated groups. The US intelligence community agrees that al-Qaeda's Core leadership has been degraded by the persistent pressure applied by , the alQaeda Core under the leadership of As-Ayman Al-Zawarhiri, is still a potential threat to the US. As long as it continues to exist, the Core provides cohesion and unity of purpose to the larger al-Qaeda enterprise through strategic vision, ideology, and spiritual inspiration.
al-Qaeda Affiliates
There is growing concern among senior US intelligence officials, as they watch the expansion of al-Qaeda ideology through affiliated organizations, often operating in unstable regions. 16 
Loosely Affiliated Groups
There are other affiliates that carry the al-Qaeda label, but have little to no operational reach or capability beyond their local sphere of influence. These groups can be regarded as loosely affiliated organizations and their direct link to al-Qaeda is difficult to confirm. The Tuareg rebels in Northern Mail fall into this category. In a late-2011 bid to gain regional autonomy, the Tuareg made alliances of convenience with alQaeda affiliates, Ansar-Dine 20 and AQIM. However, it would be difficult to label the Tuareg as al-Qaeda affiliates that presented a grave threat to US interests. 21 The problem with groups like the Tuareg is that overstating their al-Qaeda affiliation can lead to a response strategy that defaults to CT methods and could potentially limit future engagement options, as well as build momentum towards resentment against the US and partner nation's governments. Therefore, such loosely affiliated groups must be thoroughly analyzed before they are designated as al-Qaeda affiliates with operational reach.
In summary, al-Qaeda Core remains a real threat to the US. The organization still has the intent, capability, structure and enough of a network to plan for attacks against US interests. Amongst affiliate organizations, those with a clear ideological and operational alignment with al-Qaeda and the capability to achieve regional and global objectives continue to represent a threat to the US and its interests. The US should focus the majority of its SFA and foreign aid attention on assisting the nations battling this category of affiliate.
Safe Haven
A centerpiece of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) and now an enduring component of the overall US Security Strategy is the necessity to deny al-Qaeda and its
affiliates the ability to operate in safe haven. A terrorist safe haven is defined as, "an area of relative security that can be exploited by terrorists to undertake activities such as recruiting, training, fundraising, and planning operations." 22 Safe havens are not merely defined by a physical or geographic location. They can also exist in the cyber realm, in urban settings, in free societies and within many existing legal statutes. 23 In addition, safe havens are not limited to failed states and ungoverned spaces, as it is argued by some that the austere and undeveloped conditions of failed states can present severe operational challenges to terrorists. 24 However, for the purpose of this paper, safe haven is confined to a geographic location within the borders of an internationally recognized nation-state, with the area of haven falling outside of the control of the state's security and governance apparatus. It is these types of areas that terrorist groups like al-Qaeda and its affiliates seek to occupy, to facilitate their ability to plan, prepare, and execute future operations. 25 While it is possible for al-Qaeda safe havens to exist in relatively secure nation states such as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, they most often emerge in unstable regions beyond the operational reach of local governance and security forces, or in states that are on the verge of collapse.
Failed and Failing States
Failed and failing states represent a central feature in the campaign against alQaeda and trans-national terrorist groups, as they are no longer viewed solely as a humanitarian issue. 26 They are now viewed as potential threats to the US and its allies.
Writing in Foreign Affairs Robert Rothberg stated that, "In the wake of September 11, the threat of terrorism has given the problem of failed nation-states an immediacy and importance that transcends its previous humanitarian dimension" 27 Within the developing world, those states which have made the least progress and have remained mired in low income and high poverty levels have been the most prone to conflict, while those which have done relatively better have reduced the risks of conflict and insecurity….there is a close empirical relationship between civil war and low income. Poverty increases the likelihood of civil war and war is a prime cause of poverty. 29 Breaking this cycle is an important step in reducing the likelihood that a state fails and the conditions for safe haven emerge. It cannot be ended by relying solely on the use of CT tactics, attacking al-Qaeda affiliates after they arrive in a region. In part, ending the cycle requires the establishment of a secure environment where state systems of governance have the space to develop effective security capacity. Local security forces are best suited to combat internal conflicts. Through SFA missions in selected nations where local security forces are not highly politicized or corrupt, the US can assist local governments and security forces in building the capacity to extend the reach of security, thus facilitating their ability to extend development to larger sectors of the population.
Security Force Assistance Operations
In 
Authorizing Documents and Guidance
There is a prevalent myth within some circles of the DOD and the US government that the Conventional US military is not designed for, or capable of conducting SFA missions; that somehow the tasks associated with SFA fall outside the realm of the military's primary mission, which is to fight and win the nation's wars. 31 Nothing could be further from the truth. In the last six years, significant refinements to US strategic guidance, directives and doctrine all point to the future importance and Many [stakeholders] noted that the "dual-key" nature of the 1206 Program authority requires greater interagency cooperation at various levels…several remarked that this was, in fact, the most successful aspect of the program…some stakeholders commented that since the initiation of the 1206 Program, they are "always on the phone" with their counterparts in other agencies and now meet regularly through interagency working groups 43 This check and balance system allows DOS to have direct input and oversight on every ongoing and newly initiated SFA program.
The refinements to security assistance-related strategic guidance, doctrine and authorizations over the last six years have been significant. They represent the need for increased interagency cooperation and development of implementing systems that meet the demands of countering, and eventually pre-empting transnational terrorist threats that adapt and relocate quickly. They also serve as notice to the US Army that the future will see more, not less SFA operations and that Conventional Forces are going to be called upon to execute operational requirements that Special Operations
Forces units are unable to meet.
US Army Conventional Forces and SFA
In the era of competing demands and security challenges, a debate in the Army continues surrounding the question of whether or not Conventional Army Brigade
Combat Teams are the right units for employment in SFA operations. 44 Contemporary strategic guidance, current doctrine, the nature of the threat posed by al-Qaeda operating in safe havens, and requests for units capable of executing security cooperation tasks from Combatant Commanders, which are often beyond the ability of SOF units to source, all point to the reality that requirements for Conventional Forcesourced SFA operations are unlikely to diminish in the future. The Army's challenge is to ensure it embraces SFA as a primary mission and that if it is not going to establish a standing SFA Advisor formation, then it needs to ensure the Conventional Brigade
Combat Teams it selects to conduct security cooperation tasks are properly organized, trained and fully capable of executing SFA missions.
Advantages of SFA Operations
Properly applied, US Army Conventional Forces trained to execute SFA operations provide an effective resource to US Ambassadors and military commanders for combating al-Qaeda and their affiliates attempting to establish or exploit regional safe havens. SFA operations typically do not require the deployment of large troop formations; they are small footprint, flexible and provide multiple employment options. were rarely above 700. 55 One of the participants, in summarizing the SFA approach stated, "The heart of the strategy is based on building relationships, reinforcing legitimate institutions, building security force capabilities, sharing intelligence, and information and developing focused civil military programs and aggressively promoting local acts of good governance." 56 Success was gained through a sound application of the principles of SFA, which ultimately enabled partner security forces operations.
Despite some of the recent Security Assistance successes, there are opponents of military SFA operations and the strategy of partnering with and training local security forces to secure their own territory. They claim that the US has overstated the threat of al-Qaeda and its affiliates and that SFA operations are a poor use of defense dollars and ineffective in developing long-term partner capacity. 57 Additionally, his overall critique discounts the threat of al-Qaeda and its affiliates, repeats the often mentioned, but rarely quantified statement that US involvement abroad, " … will increase rather than diminish, threats to America's security" 61 and offers that in many cases concerning US engagement within failed or failing states that, "the best course of action is to do nothing at all." 62 Doing nothing, while always an option, might lead to a loss of initiative in the fight against al-Qaeda and place partner nations, and potentially the US, at greater risk. The key is to apply SFA judiciously as an enabling effort to support the overall host nation security strategy as directed by the US Ambassador. If a SFA effort would further empower a corrupt and repressive local government than it would be unwise to apply it in those conditions.
Foreign engagement often includes the risk of establishing some of the conditions Ambassador Jett identifies in his writings. The current DOS and DOD security assistance legal guidelines mitigate some of these risks through the checks and balances described earlier. There is no desire to challenge the primacy of the DOS in all foreign nation engagement initiatives and strategies. However, when the conditions are favorable and improving the security forces of host nation might lead to greater stability of the government, then SFA conducted by the US military is potentially a very effective tool.
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A second concern that arises when examining recent SFA success is whether or not US Conventional Forces can replicate the efforts of SOF elements. In US Army SOF units, a typical ODA is comprised of one Captain, a senior warrant officer, and ten non-commissioned officers. Before acceptance into Special Forces training, every team member must complete a difficult physical and psychological assessment process, followed by duty-specific qualification and language training, which can last up to 36 months, depending upon specific requirements. The average time in the Army for an ODA team member is around 11 years and teams generally remain intact for several years. These conditions create a mature, experienced and cohesive military unit that thrives in complex and adaptive environments. 
29
The successful conclusion of operations in Iraq and our pending transition in Afghanistan give us an opportunity to reorient the Army towards conflict prevention --working through engagement with partners and allies across the globe. However, the ability to win wars on land remains our reason for being. Potential adversaries must never question whether this nation has the ability to spoil aggressive aims or ultimately reverse illicit gains. We do not seek war, but others must never doubt our ability to win decisively when it occurs. 
Training Focus
When the Army aligns a unit to a Regional Combatant Command for employment in a SFA role, the unit must arrive in theater fully trained. This is will be especially 31 important in the first iterations of RAF deployments. If Combatant Commanders and US Ambassadors do not immediately see the value added of Army SFA formations, it could jeopardize the entire RAF concept. To avoid this, the Army has to ensure SFA missions receive the mission-specific training required, even at the risk of core competency warfighting task proficiency.
The current US Army training path for RAF units, as they progress towards availability for deployment, emphasizes that Brigades gain proficiency in their core competency tasks, which focus heavily on combined arms maneuver and wide-area security. 74 Currently, a RAF Brigade must complete a Decisive Action, Culminating
Training Event (CTE) at one of the Army's maneuver training centers before the unit is deployed on its assigned mission. 75 The risk associated with this methodology is that if the Brigade is deploying to conduct a security cooperation mission, then SFA-specific tasks, such as intense culture, language, and host nation security forces familiarization training might not receive the attention preferred by those who favor SFA units.
Therefore, once an Army Brigade is designated as a RAF, and receives its SFA mission requirements from the Combatant Commander, those tasks must then become the primary training focus for the unit. Commanders cannot approach SFA tasks as an afterthought to core competency and Decisive Action training.
Continuity
Finally, the Army must avoid episodic engagements with partner nation security forces. To build continuity and lasting relationships with partner nations, SFA units must remain available for deployments into Combatant Command areas of responsibility for a period of up to nine months. SFA missions, with their high premium on partnerships and human relationships demand a commitment to long-term engagements between partner units. Once a unit reaches the deployment phase in the ARGORGEN model, it is by design available for a year-long deployment. To achieve the full benefit of SFA operations, the duration of deployments must allow sufficient time for the building of relationships and the development of organizational competence. 
